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Jefferies: Nature and Proof of Discriminatory Discharge

LAW NOTES
NATURE AND PROOF OF DISCRIMINATORY'
DISCHARGE
In the development of legislation which seeks to establish
a balance in the relative economic bargaining positions of
labor and management, it was apparent that the employer
must retain some prerogative in respect to tenure and conditions of employment. 2 However, it was also recognized that
to allow this constitutionally protected right to be enjoyed
free of all restraint was to ring the "death knell" on all organizational overtures made by labor. Thus, the doctrine has
become firmly entrenched in labor-management relations that
an employer may discharge for good cause, bad cause, or for
no cause at all, so long as such discharge is not merely an
artifice for the thwarting of union activity or membership.
But though the recognition of the right and the limitation
exists amid relatively little dispute, the question of how the
employer may lawfully exercise the right, as opposed to those
circumstances in which its application constitutes a violation
of the National Labor Relations Act as amended, 3 has been
the subject of incessant and heated debate.
Since the limitation is couched in words to the effect that
the employer may discharge for any reason so long as such
reason is not a denial of the employee's rights as guaranteed
1. Discrimination as here used involves the attempt to distinguish,
relative to treatment of employees, between those who are members

of a union or engaged in union activities, and those who are not,
thereby encouraging or discouraging union membership. The discrimination is based solely on their union membership and no distinction
is made on the basis of whether the jobs are comparable or noncomparable. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 107 F. 2d 555 (7th
Cir. 1939); Botany Worsted Mills, 4 NLRB 292 (1937), enforced as
modified, 106 F. 2d 263 (3rd Cir. 1939).
2. The Congressional prohibition of discrimination which interferes
with the employee's exercise of their fundamental rights does not contravene the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment because it does
not interfere with the employer's right to hire and fire, but only prohibits those acts which are coercive with respect to those employee rights
which are protected by the Act. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313
U. S. 177 (1941); NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S.
240 (1939).
3. Labor-Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U. S. C.
1141 et seq. (1956).
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by sections seven 4 and thirteen 5 of the Act, perhaps it is
best that the problem be viewed from the standpoint of the
requirements for establishing a violation rather than to resort
to a search for types of conduct which may be violative of
the Act. Were the scope of the problem so restricted that it
could be resolved by a determination of just what an employer may not do, it would long since have been sent packing
by the promulgation of a list of those acts which constitute
violations. However, the ultimate issue is often confounded
with matters subjective in nature, such as the employer's
intent, thereby necessitating an examination of evidentiary
matters bearing on the establishment of a violation. Consequently, in order to treat the subject adequately the problem
is hereinafter divided into segments which will allow: first,
a general study of the nature of the discrimination discharge;
second, an insight into the elements of proof of a violation;
and third, a study of those circumstances wherein there lie
both valid and invalid motives for discharge.
SCOPE AND NATURE OF DISCRIMINATION DISCHARGES

While the Act does not compel an employee to join any
union organization, it does guarantee him the right to join or
not to join at his discretion. It is, inter alid, the purpose of
the Act to guarantee that in the event an employee does choose
to affiliate with such an organization, he may do so without
fear of interference, restraint, or coercion.6 Thus, the provisions of the Act prohibit an employer from discriminating
against an employee in any connection of the employment because of the latter's affiliation with, or his refusal to join,
any particular labor union or group. However, an employee
4. " . . . Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organization, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all
of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected
by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment as authorized in section 8(a) (3) . .. " Labor
Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U. S. C. § 157 et seq.
(1956).
5. " . . . Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for
herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or
diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or
qualifications of that right . . . " Labor Management Relations Act,
61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U. S. C.§ 163 et seq. (1956).
6. Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U. S. C.
§ 158(a) (1) (1952).
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may be discharged for good reason, bad reason, or for no
reason at all, so long as such discharge does not violate the
provisions of the Act. The NLRA, as amended, makes it unlawful to discharge an employee where such discharge is
motivated merely by a desire to encourage or discourage
union membership or activity. 7 It is quite evident that when
such discharge is considered in the light of the employee's
right to engage in, or refuse to engage in, union activities,
it has a coercive effect on all employees as well as the dischargee. Likewise, to discharge an employee for refraining
from union activities would have a similar effect.
These prohibitions do not mean that the employer may no
longer control his employment practices. 8 The management
prerogatives are restricted only to the extent that they may
not engage in acts which would operate to defeat the legislative intent, i.e., the protection of the employee's right of selforganization or the right to refrain therefrom. 9 Thus, the
employer may take any action he desires so long as such action does not take a form which is motivated by anti- or prounion design.
The most obvious and clear-cut violation of the Act is when
an employer discharges an employee for union activity and
that alone. More often, however, the motives are not clear
and there exists little or no evidence to indicate the true reason for which the employee was discharged. Seldom does the
employer admit that his discharge of an employee was predicated upon anti-union design, and in such cases the anti-union
history of the employer is subjected to close scrutiny. Circumstantial evidence is sometimes so strong as to provide
little doubt that the discharge was grounded on illegal motive.
Where one has been often praised for his good work and
loyalty and shortly after his affiliation with a union he is
discharged, it is obvious that the motive was to discourage
union activity.'0
When the motivating factor on the part of the employer is
not clearly defined, unlawful motivation may be indicated by
a variety of circumstances. Among those factors which have
been held to show an attempt to encourage or discourage
7. Labor Management Relations Act, 65 Stat. 601 (1947), 29 U. S. C.
§ 158(a) (3) (1951).
8. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1 (1937).
9. Ibid.
10. Illinois Tool Works, 65 NLRB 1181 (1946).
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union membership or activity are the following: timing of
the discharge," a past history of interference, restraint and
coercion,' 2 threats of disciplinary action,' 3 surveillance prior
to the discharge, 14 expressed satisfaction with the work of the
dischargee,' 5 employment of new workers immediately after
discharge,' 6 absence of any good cause for discharge and the
17
presence of one of the above factors.
Employers have the right to make rules governing the employees' conduct with reference to company property, and
8
have the right to discipline those who violate such rules.
The only time company rules may be found to be unlawful is
when such rules are anti-union from their inception or when
there is an absence of equality in their enforcement due to
union membership or activity. Additionally, violations have
been found where the dischargee violated rules characterized
as follows: rules that are seldom enforced, 9 ambiguous,2 0
vague,2 ' rules that are used as a trap,22 and where the rule
is not generally known.23
The burden of proof of a discriminatory discharge rests on
the NLRB General Counsel, 24 and in order to sustain such
burden he must establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that such discharge was unlawfully motivated. Where the
General Counsel makes out a strong prima facie case of discrimination, the employer must then convincingly show that

the discharge was predicated on non-discriminatory reasons.2 5
The probative value of the testimony thus offered by the
11. NLRB v. Burnette Castings Co., 177 F. 2d 203 (6th Cir. 1949).
12. NLRB v. Servel, Inc., 149 F. 2d 542 (7th Cir. 1945); NLRB v.
Bear Brand Hosiery Co., 131 F. 2d 731 (7th Cir. 1942).
13. NLRB v. Marquette Metal Products Co., 152 F. 2d 964 (6th Cir.
1946) ; NLRB v. Winter, 154 F. 2d 719 (10th Cir. 1946).
14. NLRB v. Baltimore Transit Co., 140 F. 2d 51 (4th Cir. 1944).
15. NLRB v. Rock Hill Printing & Finishing Co., 131 F. 2d 171 (4th
Cir. 1942).
16. NLRB v. El Paso-Ysleta Bus Line, Inc., 190 F. 2d 261 (5th Cir.
1951); Warren Co., 90 NLRB 689 (1950), enforced, 197 F. 2d 814 (5th
Cir. 1952).
17. Reeves-Ely Laboratories, 76 NLRB 728 (1948).
18. NLRB v. Mylan-Sparta Co., 166 F. 2d 485 (6th Cir. 1948).
19. NLRB v. Harbinson-Walker Refractories Co., 135 F. 2d 837 (8th
Cir. 1943).
20. Fellows d.b.a. American Patrol Service, 75 NLRB 662 (1947).
21. NLRB v. Dixie Shirt Co., 176 F. 2d 969 (4th Cir. 1949).
22. NLRB v. Polson Logging Co., 136 F. 2d 314 (9th Cir. 1943).
23. Selig Mfg. Co., 79 NLRB 1144 (1948).
24. NLRB v. Radio Officers Union, 196 F. 2d 960 (2nd Cir. 1952).
25. Sawyer Downtown Motors, 103 NLRB 1735 (1953), enforced, 213
F. 2d 514 (7th Cir. 1954); Treadway, 109 NLRB 1045 (1954), enforced,
222 F. 2d 719 (5th Cir. 1955).
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employer is a matter within the determination of the Board,
and may be rejected if the evidence or the circumstances sub26
stantially contradict such testimony. As a general rule, such
finding by the Board will not be overthrown by the court
27
merely because there is conflicting testimony. Thus, in those
cases where justifiable cause is alleged as a defense, the
weight of the evidence is the controlling factor. If the Board
finds that the weight of the evidence is in favor of the employer then no violation will be found. But where the justification offered by the employer is found to be a mere pretext, though the justifiable cause does exist, the conduct
will be deemed unlawful. A finding that a discharge was
discriminatory is usually accompanied by a reinstatement
order and an award of back pay. The Board derives the
power to order such affirmative action from section 10 (c) of
28
the Act.
Unions may be guilty of an unfair labor practice if they
force an employer to discriminate against an employee for
unlawful reasons. 29 However, the fact that the union has
violated the Act does not relieve the employer of liability for
his conduct. Where a violation has been established and the
employee is reinstated with back pay, both the employer and
the union must contribute equally to such amount, though
either may be solely liable where only one of them is charged.
It should be noted that in only two instances is the union
justified in inducing an employer to discharge an employee.
The first is for the failure on the part of the employee to pay
union dues; and the second, for failure to pay initiation fees. 0
ESTABLISHING A VIOLATION

In the foregoing discussion the nature and general characteristics of a discriminatory discharge have been brought to
light and the problem areas denominated. Considering now
that there has, in fact, been a violation of the Act due to an
unlawful discharge by an employer, it is necessary to inquire
26. NLRB v. Wiltse, 188 F. 2d 917 (6th Cir. 1951).
27. NLRB v. Tri-State Casualty Ins. Co., 188 F. 2d 50 (10th Cir.

1951).

28. Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U. S. C.
§ 160(c) (1952).
29. Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U. S. C.

§ 158(b) (2)

(1952).

This section makes it an unfair labor practice for

a labor organization "To cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) ."

30. Ibid.
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into the nature of proof required to establish the violation.
There are three elements of proof which must be considered
in the light of their respective significance insofar as unlawful discrimination is concerned. First, knowledge on the part
of the employer that the dischargee was actually engaged in
protected union activity. Second, that the motive behind the
discharge was to encourage or discourage union membership
or activity. And third, the necessity for the conduct to have
actually encouraged or discouraged protected union activity.
(1) In order for the Board to find that the discharge is
discriminatory within the meaning of the Act, it must be
shown that the employer knew, or under the circumstances
may be charged with knowledge, that the dischargee had
actually participated in protected concerted activity.31 This
knowledge constitutes an indispensable element of proof, for
unless it can be established there can be no showing of antiunion motive behind the discharge.3 2 Where, as is often the
case, there is no evidence available which would tend to prove
knowledge on the part of the employer, it may be established
by inference from accompanying circumstances.3 3 However,
such proof may not be supplied by inference in the absence
34
of substantial evidentiary support.
Suppose a situation arises wherein there is a discharge and
the employer defends on the grounds that he had no knowledge of union activity on the part of the dischargee. Knowledge may be considered to have been established where the
evidence indicates that the employer has made anti-union
statements, or has cooperated with other employers in obtaining resignations of the latter's employees from the union. 35
Activities such as photographing picket lines, keeping attendance records during a strike, or the sending of letters to dischargees urging them to return to work, may also operate to
establish that the employer did have knowledge of the dischargee's activity. However, in the absence of such direct
31. NLRB v. Shen-Valley Meat Packers, 211 F. 2d 289 (4th Cir.
1954) ; NLRB v. Booker, 180 F. 2d 727 (5th Cir. 1950).
32. Hancock Trucking Co., 109 NLRB 80 (1954); Soerens Motor Co.,
106 NLR.B 652 (1953).
33. Angwell Curtain Co. v. NLRB, 192 F. 2d 899 (7th Cir. 1951);
Hartland Plastics, Inc., 93 NLRB 439 (1951).
34. Indiana Metal Products Corp. v. NLRB, 202 F. 2d 613 (7th Cir.
1953); NLRB v. Smith Transportation Co., 193 F. 2d 142 (5th Cir.
35. Editorial "El Emparcial" Inc., 99 NLRB 8 (1952); Wallick &
Schwalm Co., 95 NLRB 1262 (1951), enforced, 198 F. 2d 477 (3rd Cir.
1952).
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circumstantial evidence, he may be charged with constructive notice due to the surrounding employment conditions.
Constructive knowledge has been charged where the dis36
charge took place in a small community or in a small plant,
or where there has been ample opportunity for the employer
37
to observe open union activity.
(2) Though knowledge of protected union activity is an
essential element in the proof of an unlawful discharge, it
must be coupled with proof of anti-union motivation before
a violation may be established. Unlawful motive is the very
essence of an unlawful discriminatory discharge, as is indicated by the fact that it has been well established that employer prerogatives, relative to tenure of employment, are
limited only to the extent that he may not discharge for the
purpose of encouraging or discouraging union membership
or activity. 38 If the motive behind the discharge is based on
cause, there is no violation; the motive must be grounded on
anti-union animus. Thus, since the motive is the controlling
factor, the problem of just what will constitute a sufficiency
of proof of an unlawful motive is of paramount importance.
This problem of sufficiency of evidence is made more difficult by the fact that motive is a subjective matter, and
there exists a natural tendency to "grasp at straws" in order
to establish its illegality. Consequently, great care must be
exercised in identifying that on which the conduct is predicated, lest the broad policies of the Act be lost from view or
submerged in a myriad of technicalities whereby they become
dissipated by the resulting "hair-line" distinctions.
In order that this danger may be accurately studied and
evaluated it is necessary to understand the general nature
and operation of the National Labor Relations Board, as well
as its policy in relation to employer motive. The Board was
established to act in the capacity of, and in the same manner as, any other administrative tribunal. That is, to act as
a panel of experts which is better able to deal with the highly
specialized problems which arise in the labor-management
36. S. S. Coachman & Sons, 99 NLRB 670 (1952), enforced, 203 F. 2d

109 (5th Cir. 1953); Connecticut Chemical Research Corp., 98 NLRB
160 (1952).

37. Mooresville Mills, 99 NLRB 572 (1952), enforced as modified,

204 F. 2d 87 (4th Cir. 1953); Keeshin Poultry Co., 97 NLRB 467

(1951).
38. Labor Management Relations Act, 65 Stat. 601 (1947), 29 U. S. C.

§ 158(a) (3)

(1956).
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field. By virtue of their expert knowledge, there is little
doubt that the Board has the power to draw inferences, or
to infer consequences from the particular fact situations
before them. However, it is of the utmost importance that
these inferences be supported by substantial and credible
evidence, for otherwise their decisions would be the result of
idle speculation or conjecture, which is no more acceptable
on their part than it would be if engaged in by the courts.
Since the Board has the power to draw inferences, the
question arises relative to the advisability of allowing the
Board to find a motive unlawful by inference, in the light
of the dangers previously mentioned. In other words, should
an unlawful motive be found by inference alone or must it
be established by a preponderance of the evidence. A recent
decision of the Supreme Court, while it evidences the uncertainty in this area, may be utilized to determine the intent of the Congress in this respect. 9
The decision was rendered after the hearing of three cases
together, all of which involved employer conduct as a result
of union pressure. The fact that the employer's acts were
committed entirely because of this union pressure was admitted or conceded. These cases, which were brought before
the Supreme Court on certiorari, were: NLRB v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 197 F. 2d 1 (8th Cir. 1952) ;
NLRB v. Gaynor News Co., 197 F. 2d 719 (2nd Cir. 1952);
and, NLRB v. Radio Officer's Union, 196 F. 2d 960 (2nd Cir.
1952). In all three cases the court agreed that the motive
of the employer in discriminatory conduct was the controlling factor. However, the court pointed out:
. . . It is also clear that specific evidence of intent to
encourage or discourage is not an indispensable element
of proof of violation of section 8 (a) (3) ....
This recognition that specific proof of intent is unnecessary where
employer conduct inherently encourages or discourages
union membership is but an application of the common
law rule that a man is held to intend the forseeable con40
sequences of his conduct.
There are at least three possible interpretations of this
language, which in turn represent three different interpretations of section 8 (a) (3) of the Act. The first of the pos39. 347 U. S. 17 (1954).
40. 347 U. S. 17, 44, 45 (1954).
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sible interpretations is that in the establishing of an unlawful discriminatory discharge, it is never essential to prove
the motive of the employer to be unlawful. Without a doubt
this is not the meaning the court had in mind, for to so hold
would be to impute a guilt to the employer which the Congress did not intend to outlaw. The Act makes only that
discrimination unlawful which is directed toward discouraging or encouraging union membership or activity, and does
4
not prohibit discrimination simpliciter. '
The second interpretation, is that in those cases where the
conduct has an inherent "tendency" to encourage or discourage, then intent is not a necessary element of proof. This
so-called "tendency" test appears on the surface to be reasonable when grounded on the argument that the proof of motive
is too difficult in that it involves a subjective element which
does not lend itself readily to the scrutiny of a court or administrative body. But while the theory is in some measure
sound, its application proves most impractical and would tend
to defeat the intendment of the Act. By way of illustration,
suppose an employer has not taken cognizance of the fact
that an employee is engaged in protected union activity, and
it happens that the employee is discharged for cause, or for
that matter, for no cause at all. The fact that an actively
engaged union member is discharged would be interpreted
by some, and most assuredly by the dischargee himself, as
the manifestation of anti-union animus. Insofar as the intendment of the Congress is concerned there has been no
violation, yet, it may be found that the discharge had an
inherent "tendency" to encourage or discourage union or
concerted activity. The premise that gives birth to this view
is that it is impossible, or at least impractical, to evaluate
the motive of the employer due to its inherent subjectivity,
yet advocating the evaluation of the inherent effect, or "tendency," of the conduct with regard to its possible encouraging
or discouraging affect on union activity. This latter undertaking involves the evaluation of the resUlting attitude of
dozens, or even hundreds, of employees which is an even more
confounding subjective study. Thus, the application of this
"tendency" test is in itself a contradiction.
To follow this interpretation further, it is obvious that the
immediate effect of its application is to place the employer at
41. See note 38 supra.
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a greatly inferior position in the economic conflict. Any act
on his part could be construed to encourage or discourage
some one or some group in their relation to protected concerted activity. It places a premium on the avoidance of any
affirmative act by the employer and thereby inhibits the
exercise of his constitutionally protected right to engage in
business enterprises and to operate and manage them in the
manner which he deems economically necessary. Additionally, the application of this view would encounter the hazards
of distortion as there is no administrative framework within
which it could be safely operative.
By the third interpretation, the employer's motive in perpetrating the discriminatory act is controlling, except where
the reason for the act is conceded by the parties. In other
words, proof of motive is insignificant only in those cases in
which the true purpose behind the act is admitted either to
get a Board determination of its legality or for purposes of
confession and avoidance. This would seem to be the preferred interpretation when considered in the light of the
circumstances in the three cases, and represents a valid exception to the general rule that motive is always an essential
element in the proof of a violation. From a practical standpoint, the recognition of this exception constitutes a striking down of technical defenses and thereby allows the court
or Board to focus its attention more readily on the unadorned
merits of the case.
This interpretation receives further support from two National Labor Relations Board Annual Reports. In the first,
12 NLRB Ann. Rep. 29 (1947), it was stated:
Where the fact of unlawful discrimination existed, the
Board held motive immaterial.
Thus it is stated that there is no necessity to prove a motive
which after its proof adds nothing to the case in question.
The rationale undoubtedly is that where the unlawful discriminatory conduct has been admitted, consumption of the
Board's or court's time with that which has already been
established would be to call too heavily on its patience.
In 15 NLRB Ann. Rep. 104 (1950), the fact that the above
circumstance represents an exception was further established
when the Board said:
For the Board to find a violation of this section, a pre-

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol9/iss3/6

10

Jefferies: Nature and Proof of Discriminatory Discharge
LAW NOTES

455

ponderance of the evidence must show that the employer
acted from illegal motive.
When these two reports are read together, the conclusion
necessarily follows that it is necessary to prove by the preponderance of the evidence that the motive of the employer
was unlawful in all cases where the anti-union intent is not
admitted. To hold otherwise would be to allow the employee
virtually complete immunity in the commission of acts in defiance of the employer's lawful orders or regulations. To tie
the hands of one of the parties in the economic scale would
not effectuate the policies of the Act, but would instead open
the gates to protected harassing.
(3) The last element of proof relative to establishing a
violation resolves itself into the question of whether the conduct must have the actual effect of encouraging or discouraging membership in labor organizations. In a vast majority
of the cases the Board and courts have acted, without treating the issue explicitly, as though proof of discriminatory
motive was sufficient in itself to establish a violation. However, a few cases have met this question squarely and have
resulted in conflicting decisions.42
The predominant view seems to be that it is not necessary
that the record show independent evidence that the unlawful
discriminatory discharge had the actual effect of discouraging unionism. 43 Nor is actual evidence of encouragement or
discouragement of employees essential since discrimination
necessarily discourages union membership insofar as the dischargee is concerned. 44 The Supreme Court has implied that
a violation of the Act could be established by the presentation
of substantial evidence that the discriminatory act was motivated by a desire to encourage or discourage union membership or activity, without having to show that the actual
42. NLRB v. Air Associates, Inc., 121 F. 2d 586 (2nd Cir. 1941). In
this case the court held that section 8 (a) (3) required that the discrimi-

nation discharge have both the purpose and effect of discouraging or encouraging union activity. However, the same judge in the later case of
NLRB v. Cities Service Oil Co., 129 F. 2d 933 (2nd Cir. 1942), indicated

that the doctrine should be "very narrowly limited." Compare: NLRB
v. Radio Officers Union, 196 F. 2d 960 (2nd Cir. 1952); Western Cartridge Co. v. NLRB, 134 F. 2d 240 (7th Cir. 1943); and Rapid Roller Co.
v. NLRB, 126 F. 2d 452 (7th Cir. 1942).
43. NLRB v. Boswell Co., 136 F. 2d 585 (9th Cir. 1943); Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U. S. 177.
44. NLRB v. Boswell Co., 136 F. 2d 585 (9th Cir. 1943).
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effect of the employer conduct was in fact to discourage or
45
encourage such organized activities.
Thus, it would appear that insofar as this element of proof
is concerned, the Board may reasopably infer from the fact
that the discrimination was illegally motivated, that the
actual effect of the discrimination was to encourage or discourage union activities. 46 To require its proof would without
a doubt create an unnecessary hardship on the General
Counsel due to the fact that the results of such an act are
often difficult to accurately evaluate even in retrospect. This
view would seem to be in accord with the intendment of the
Act as it merely makes illegal the particular act of discrimination when predicated on the desire to discourage or encourage union activities, and does not expressly or impliedly concern itself as to whether the desired result was accomplished
by such employer conduct.47 In other words, it is the conduct
itself that is forbidden, and a violation is not contingent on
the success or failure of such conduct.
As a result of the foregoing discussion of the elements of
proof of a violation, it appears that as a general rule the
Board always has the burden of proof of a violation. 48 However, the establishment of a prima facie case shifts the butden of going forward with the evidence to the employer, who
must then establish an affirmative defense. 49 The resulting
decision of the Board, if based on the preponderance of the
evidence from the record in its entirety, is conclusive on a
reviewing court.
WHERE DUAL MOTIVE IS INVOLVED

The problem of dual motive exists in those cases, where
upon examination of the facts, it appears that there are two
possible motives either of which may be assigned as the reaoon for the discharge. One of these motives is predicated on
anti-union animus, while the other is grounded on an actual
violation by the dischargee of a valid company rule which
has in the past justified discharge. The first constitutes a
violation of the provisions of section 8(a) (1), while the
45. NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S. 240 (1939).
46. NLRB v. Vail Mfg. Co., 158 F. 2d 664 (7th Cit,. 1947).
47. See note 7 supra.
48. NLRB v. Reynolds International Pen Co., 162 F. 2d 680 (7th Cir.

1947); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 107 F. 2d 555 (7th Cir.
1939).
49. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, supra note 48.
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latter is a valid exercise of an employer prerogative and
would not support an unfair labor practice charge. The dual
motivation situation is distinguished from a "pretext" discharge in that the alleged justification for the discharge in
the latter case is merely an attempt to relabel an actual discriminatory discharge which was in fact entirely predicated
on anti-union motivation.
If, in the examination of an alleged unfair labor practice
based on discriminatory conduct, it is found that dual motivation exists, there are several possible ways in which the
matter could be resolved. The first basis on which the case
may be decided is that where there exists an unlawful motive,
an unfair labor practice will be found notwithstanding the
fact that te preponderalice of the evidence may indicate
that the discharge was for valid reasons. Second, where a
valid motive is established the Board may not consider the
possible existence of an anti-union motive. And third, that
both motives shall be weighed and the determination made
on the basis of a preponderance of the evidence. Or, in other
words,, where there is a balancing of the evidence offered by
the parties, the Board may not find an unfair labor practice,
In deternining which of the above mentioned criterian is
to be utilized, such determin4ation must be made on the basis
of which one is in the greatest accord with the intendment
of the Act. In order to find such intendment, resort must
he made not only to the Act itself but also to the court and
Board decisions rendered thereunder. Two sections of the
Act are controlling and must be considered together. The
first, section 8(a) (1), makes interference, restraint, and
coercion of employees in the exercise of their rights under
section 7 an unfair labor practice. Q And the second, section
1G(c), grants the Board power to order reinstatement with
back pay in cases where section 8(a) (1) through (5) is
violated.5 1 The cases under the original section 10(c) held
that discharge "for cause" fails to provide grounds for reinstatement, and subsequent to these decisions, the section
50. See note 6 supra.
51. " ..
.
the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue
and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person

to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take such
affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without
back pay, as will effectuate the policies of the Act . . . " Labor-Manage-

ment Relations Act, 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U. S. C. § 160(c) (1952).
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was amended to include this "for cause" proviso. 52 The purpose in making such an amendment when the section had
been accorded similar interpretation by the courts has been
the subject of much confusion, and this confusion has manigested itself particularly in the area of dual motivation. It
is obvious that to resolve this confusion is to prescribe the
manner in which the Board is required to treat the dual motivation cases.
Senator Taft expressed the view that the amendment was
made merely to state the then existing rule that where there
was a discharge for cause there would not be reinstatement,
but that where discrimination because of union activities was
evidenced then reinstatement would be ordered, and that in
all events such cases constituted controversies of fact for
the determination of the Board. 53 Little can be said to criticize
this view; however, a more basic reason underlies the promulgation of the amendment. This is made apparent by the fact
that in the past the Board has approached these cases involving dual motivation from the standpoint of determining if
in fact the discharge was motivated, at least in part, by antiunion animus. Where it was found that anti-union feeling
did constitute at least a part of the motivation, then reinstatement was ordered.5 4 As a result, a number of cases radiate the implication that union affiliation provides immunity
from discharge regardless of the seriousness of the alleged
conduct.55 Consequently, though the general attitude is to
uphold the Board's decisions, 56 several court decisions under
the original NLRA criticized the Board, at least by way of
implication, for their extreme zeal in respect to the finding
of unlawful motive and refused to enforce the reinstatement
orders when they were inconsistent with the weight of the
evidence. 7 These court decisions are reflected in the statement of the House Committee which revised section 10 (c)
when they stated:
52. " . . . No order of the Board shall require the reinstatement of
any individual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged, or
the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended or
discharged for cause ...

" Labor-Management Relations Act, Ibid.

53. 93 Cong. Rec. 6518 (1947).
54. 7 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 797 (1939).

55. Hearst, 10 NLRB 1299 (1939), herein is found an extreme de-

cision.

56. NLRB v. Nabors, 196 F. 2d 272 (5th Cir. 1952).
57. Wyman-Grodon Co., 62 NLRB 561 (1945), denying enforcement

of Board's reinstatement order in 153 F. 2d 480 (7th Cir. 1946); NLRB
v. Montgomery Ward and Co., 157 F. 2d 486 (8th Cir. 1946).
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A third change in section 10 (c) forbids the Board to

reinstate an individual unless the weight of the evidence
was not suspended or disshows that the individual
8
charged for cause...5

This statement considered in the light of the court decisions refusing to enforce the reinstatement orders of the
Board would seem to indicate that the primary purpose of -the
amendment was to promulgate a more rigid standard relative
to the burden of proof.5 9 If this be true, then the Board is
required to make its decision in dual motivation cases on a
basis of the preponderance of the evidence. Thus, it may
well be assumed that this theory represents the underlying
reason for the new note of awareness of its duty in establishing proof of discriminatory motive, for in at least two of the
Board's recent decisions it has shown a tendency to disregard
suspicion and inference as being an acceptable substitute
60
which will fulfill the duty of proof.

It must be noted, however, that a recent case has again
injected some doubt into this area due, primarily, to the fact
that its decision is subject to varying interpretations. The
case is NLRB v. Huber & Huber Motor Express, (5th Cir.
1955) 223 F. 2d 748. Therein an employee was discharged for
failure to submit certain required reports on at least two
occasions. The NLRB found that the employee had been discriminatorily discharged as a result of his union activities.
In an action brought by the Board to enforce their reinstatement order the court denied enforcement saying:
..

Where the Board could as reasonably infer a proper

collateral motive as an improper one, the act of the
management cannot be set aside as being improperly motivated.. 61

Taking the statement literally, it would seem to import
that where there are two possible motives behind the discharge, one being "for cause," and the other to discourage
union activity, the Board may not find as a matter of law
that the employer violated the Act. This is directly opposed to the view taken by the Board under the original
58. H. Rep. 245, 80th Cong., 1st sess., p. 42 (1947).
59. Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U. S. C.
§ 160(c) (1952).
60. Milwaukee Nash Co., 105 NLRB 684 (1953); Radio Industries,
Inc., 101 NLRB 912 (1952).
61. NLRB v. Huber & Huber Motor Express, Inc., 223 F. 2d 748 (5th
Cir. 1955).
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section 10 (a) and seems unreasonable because if such were
the ease, the Board could not look at the motive of the

employer in any case wherein dual motives are involved even
though the unlawful motive greatly outweighed the alleged
just cause. On the other hand, the language could indicate
that the court interpreted the amended section to mean that
while the Board may find a discrimi-natory discharge, they
may not issue a reinstatement order. This interpretation is

invalidated by the fact that the purpose of section 1.(c)
is to give the Board sufficient authority to prevent unfair
labor practices, and would thus contradict the terms of the

Act.
More lilkely than those possibilities heretofore mentioned is
the view that the court felt that where there is a balancing
of the evidence which tends to indicate a proper, as well as
an improper, motive, then substantial evidence has not been
presented which is sufficient to meet the requirement of
preponderance. 62 Thus, this case is found to be in accord with
others under the amended section as well as with the purpose
of the amendment as expressed by the House Committee, and
consequently represents the most accepted interpretation of
the Act with regard to the requirements of proof in the area
of dual motivation.
CONCLUSION
In the foregoing discussion consideration has been given
to those situations in which the proper relationship between
the employer's right to hire and fire, on the one hand, and
the employee's right to engage in concerted union activity
on the other, is particularly difficult to maintain. It has
been noted that this difficulty is attributable, at least in part,
to the fact that the legality of the particular discharge is
governed by, and interwoven with, the surroundings in which
it takes place. The result is that the determination, as to
whether the discharge was predicated upon anti-union animus
or upon some reason not violative of the Act, must be based
upon the preponderance of the evidence as derived from the
surrounding circumstances rather than upon inference and
suspicion.
Since the decision is based on the factual situation in each
particular case, no attempt was made to review all possible
62. An identical rationale was used in, NLRB v. Houston Chronicle
Publishing Co., 211 F. 2d 848 (5th Cir. 1954).
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variations which could arise under the Act. Instead, an attempt was made to advance principles, derived from a study
of the cases in conjunction with the current legislation, which
would be applicable to the vast majority of the discrimination
problems which currently arise. In advancing these principles
it was the writer's intent to present them in a form suffidently flexible to encompass as much of the field as possible ,
while retaining sufficient substance to meet the requirements
of exactness and utility. If this purpose has been achieved,
then perhaps these principles will constitute a frame of reference which will facilitate the determination of the extent
to which an employer may enjoy his right to regulate his
employmeut practices while adhering to the legislative limitations placed upon this right by the National Labor Relations Act.
JA!S D. JFFEIIES.
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